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PENNSYL VANIA COAL COMPANY v. MAHON
REVISITED: IS THE FEDERAL SURFACE
MINING ACT A VALID EXERCISE OF






The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977' is the
product of a hard-fought and lengthy battle which sought to end envi-
ronmental damage resulting from unregulated or underregulated sur-
face and deep coal mining activities.2 In the relatively short time since
its enactment, the SMCRA has been besieged by coal industry chal-
lenges. Several cases have raised the issue whether certain provisions
of the Act violate the fifth amendment prohibition against the taking of
private property without just compensation.' In each of the challenges
* A.B., Dickinson College; J.D., Duke University; Associate Professor of Law, West Vir-
ginia University.
** B.A., Wesleyan University; J.D., West Virginia University; Member of the West Virginia
Bar.
1. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, §§ 101-908, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1328 (Supp. 11 1978) [hereinafter cited as the SMCRA or as the Act].
2. Serious efforts to enact national surface mining legislation date back to 1972. For a re-
view of the legislative history of the Act, see H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 140-41,
reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 593, 672-73. For a review of the conditions
attending the Act's enactment, see Gage, 7he Failure of the Interim Regulatory Program Under the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: The ANeedjor Flexible Controls, 81 W. VA.
L. REv. 595-96 (1979). See also Dunlap, An Analysis of the Legislative History of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1975, 21 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 11 (1975).
3. See Va. Surface Min. & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980),
prob.juris noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980) (Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596); In re Permanent Surface Mining
Regulation Litigation, 13 ERC 1586, 9 ELR 20720 (D.D.C. 1979); Indiana v. Andrus, 10 ELR
20613 (S.D. Ind. 1980),prob. Jpris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980); Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 10 ELR
20328 (S.D. Iowa 1980).
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alleging an unconstitutional "taking," coal industry plaintiffs have re-
lied primarily on the 1922 landmark case, Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon .4
In Pennsylvania Coal, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Supreme Court, established a foundation for the present SMCRA tak-
ing challenges:
What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be
exercised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable
to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for consti-
tutional purposes as appropriating it or destroying it. We are
in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying
for the change.'
In Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association v. Andrus,6
the District Court for the Western District of Virginia held that section
515 of the SMCRA violated the fifth amendment taking prohibition.7
Section 515 requires surface coal mine operators to restore land mined
on steep slopes to the approximate original, pre-mining, contour. The
court found that "it is economically and physically impossible to re-
store these steep slopes to approximate original contour, and therefore,
that it is physically and economically impossible to mine the coal."8
The court indicated that even if it were possible to recreate steep slopes,
the restoration requirement reduced the value of the land to "practi-
cally nothing,"9 whereas if the land "were left stabilized with benches,
with roads already constructed, it would be worth several thousand
dollars per acre."'"
In Indiana v. Andrus," the State of Indiana and several coal com-
panies obtained an injunction against the enforcement of sections
508(a)(2), 12 510(d)(i),' 3 and 519(c)(2) of the SMCRA on the grounds
that their enforcement constituted a taking violative of the fifth amend-
4. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. Id. at 414, 416.
6. 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), prob. juris. noted, 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980).
7. Id. at 441. Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement [OSM] regulations
implementing § 515 are found in 30 C.F.R. § 715.11-716.7 (1980).
8. 483 F. Supp. at 437.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 10 ELR (E.L.I.) 20613 (S.D. Ind. June 10, 1980).
12. 30 U.S.C. § 1258(a)(2)(c) (Supp. II 1978).
13. Id. § 1260(d)(1).
1981]
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ment.14 These sections of the SMCRA relate to the mining and recla-
mation of prime farmlands. 5 The district court found as a fact that it
was technologically impossible to reclaim prime farmlands in the man-
ner required by the Act. Because such farmland is unrestorable the
court held that the Act prohibited coal mining, thereby completely de-
stroying the value of the mineral interest in violation of the taking pro-
hibition of the fifth amendment.
One other section of the SMCRA was challenged on taking
grounds in Virginia Surface Mining and in Indiana v. Andrus. In each
case, section 522 of the SMCRA was challenged by the coal companies
and held by the respective courts to be unconstitutional on its face.
Section 522 prohibits surface mining on certain federal lands and also
allows the Office of Surface Mining, or an approved state regulatory
authority, to designate other lands as unsuitable for some or all types of
coal mining.
Both the Virginia and the Indiana district courts relied principally
on Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon as the basis for invalidating the
challenged SMCRA provisions. 6 The United States Supreme Court,
however, has issued a stay of the district courts' orders pending disposi-
tion of the government appeals.' 7
The stage is thus ripe for review of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, which is perhaps the leading case in the Supreme Court's tak-
ing jurisprudence. At stake is the viability of a congressional attempt to
curtail the extensive strip mining damage by federalizing enforcement
and reclamation of such mining activities in the coal regions of the
United States.
While the slope restoration and farmland reclamation taking is-
sues are important, the invalidation of section 522 of the SMCRA in
the Virginia and Indiana cases provides the best analytical basis for
14. 10 ELR at 20621.
15. Prime agricultural lands are those available for growing crops which have the soil quali-
ty, growing season, and moisture supply needed to produce sustained high yields when treated
and managed in accordance with modem farming methods. Such lands can be farmed intensively
with minimum adverse environmental impacts, lower energy and economic inputs, and higher
yields than nonprime lands. See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 105, reprinted in [1979]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 638. See also 30 U.S.C. § 1291 (20) (Supp. 11 1978).
16. In Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, the court held that the case
before it was "on all fours with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon." 483 F. Supp. at 44. In Indiana
v. Andrus, the court relied exclusively on Pennsylvania Coal 10 ELR at 20621.
17. Andrus v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., prob. juris noted, 101 S.
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review of the taking issue in light of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 18
The following discussion will focus, therefore, on section 522 of the
SMCRA.
II. DESIGNATION OF AREAS AS UNSUITABLE FOR COAL MINING:
AN ANALYSIS OF SECTION 522 OF THE SMCRA
The SMCRA imposes uniform environmental standards19 and
gives citizens a voice in the implementation and enforcement of these
standards.20 In addition, the Act creates an Abandoned Mine Recla-
mation Fund for the restoration of orphaned lands,2 provides funds to
universities for research into problems and technology relating to sur-
face mining,22 regulates the surface effects of underground mining,23
and allows for the limitation of noncoal surface mining.24 One of the
unique aspects of the Act is that it promotes reasoned land use plan-
ning. A key provision in this respect is section 522, entitled "Designat-
ing Areas Unsuitable for Surface Coal Mining. '25
A. Basic Designations
There are three basic designations of unsuitability available under
section 522. The first, set forth in section 522(a)(2), is a mandatory
18. The prime farmland reclamation and return to approximate original contour questions
seem relatively easy to resolve. In each situation, Congress found that the reclamation of such
areas was practically and economically feasible. 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(Supp. 11 1978). Moreover,
Congress found that the failure to properly reclaim such areas resulted in significant harm to the
public. Id. § 1201(c). On lands where reclamation under the Act is impossible, Congress intended
that those lands not be mined because of the possibility of harm to the public if proper reclama-
tion could not be accomplished. Id. § 1202(c),(d). Arguably, the district courts erred when they
rejected congressional findings and substituted their own views on the feasibility of SMCRA man-
dated reclamation. See Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 10 ELR 20328, 20329-30 (S.D. Iowa 1980).
19. SMCRA §§ 515-516, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265-1266 (Supp. 111978). The Act created the Office
of Surface Mining in the Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior is charged with
administering the Act through this Office. Id. § 201(b), (c), 30 U.S.C. § 1211(b), (c) (Supp. II
1978). Regulations promulgated under this section are codified in 30 C.F.R. § 70.1-845.20 (1980),
and are accompanied by a lengthy preamble in 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902 (1979).
20. See Note, Citizen Participation in the Regulation of Surface Mining, 81 W. VA. L. REV.
(1979).
21. SMCRA §§ 401-413, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1231-1243 (Supp. I 1978).
22. Id. §§ 301-309, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1229.
23. Id. § 516, 30 U.S.C. § 1266.
24. Id. § 601, 30 U.S.C. § 1281.
25. Id. § 522, 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (Supp. I 1978). This planning concept is not entirely new
and has been codified in many states. Seegeneral Ky. KEy. STAT. § 350.085 (Supp. 1980); MD.
NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 7-505 to -505.1 (Supp. 1980); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 50-1042
(Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-14.1-05 (Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 45, §§ 781-783 (Supp.
1980); S.D. ComP. LAWS ANN. § 45-6A9.1 (Supp. 1980). See also McGinley, Prohibition of Sur-
face Mining in West Virginia, 78 W. VA. L. REV. 445 (1976).
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standard that must be triggered by a citizen petition calling for the
designation of an area as "unsuitable for all or certain types of surface
coal mining operations" if the Secretary or state regulatory authority
"determines that reclamation pursuant to the requirements of this Act
is not technically and economically feasible. '2 6
The second category, section 522(a)(3), is discretionary.27 Under
this provision, following receipt of a citizen petition, mining operation
may be designated as unsuitable for certain types of surface coal min-
ing operations if such operations will:
(1) be incompatible with existing state or local land use pro-
grams; or
(2) affect fragile or historic lands in which such operations
could result in significant damage to important historic, cul-
tural, scientific and esthetic values and natural systems; or
(3) affect renewable resource lands in which such operations
could result in substantial loss or reduction of long range pro-
ductivity of water supply or of food and fiber products, such
lands to include aquifers and aquifer recharge areas; or
(4) affect natural hazard lands in which such operations could
substantially endanger life and property, such lands to in-
clude areas subject to frequent flooding and areas of unstable
geology.28
The third category of designation, section 522(e) of the Act, may
be termed "designation by Act of Congress. 29 Section 522(e) designa-
tions do not require initiation by citizen petition, but instead prohibit
surface mining by force of law in certain protected areas. These areas
include national parks and certain federal forest lands.30 Mining oper-
ations that will adversely affect any public park or place listed in the
National Register of Historic Sites are also proscribed under section
522(e) unless special permission is obtained.3' Finally, the Act prohib-
its surface mining within specified distances of any occupied dwelling,
public road, public building, public park, or cemetery.32
26. SMCRA § 522(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
27. Id. § 522(a)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3).
28. Id. § 522(a)(3)(A)-(D), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(A)-(D).
29. Id. § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).
30. Id. § 522(e)(1)-(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1)-(2).
31. Id. § 522(e)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(3).
32. Id. § 522(e)(4)-(5), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(4)-(5).
[Vol. 16:418
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B. The "Grandfather Clause" and "Valid Existing Rights"
Designations under the first two categories, section 522(a)(2) and
(3), are subject to the limitations of a "grandfather clause":
The requirements of this section shall not apply to lands on
which surface coal mining operations are being conducted on
the date of enactment of this Act or under a permit issued
under this Act, or where substantial legal and financial com-
mitments in such operations were in existence prior to Janu-
ary 4, 1977.33
Although the phrase "substantial legal and financial commit-
ments" seems to be extremely broad, the legislative history narrows the
scope of the exemption considerably.
The phrase "substantial legal and financial commitments"
• . . is intended to apply to situations where, on the basis of a
long term coal contract, investments have been made in
powerplants, railroads, coal handling and storage facilities
and other capital-intensive activities. The committee does not
intend that mere ownership or acquisition costs of the coal
itself or the right to mine it should constitute "substantial le-
gal and financial commitments. 34
Similarly, "Designations by Act of Congress" under section 522(e)
do not allow prohibition of mining operations in existence on August 3,
1977,35 the date of enactment of the SMCRA. Section 522(e) provides
that its prohibitions are "subject to valid existing rights. 36 Valid ex-
isting rights are defined by Department of Interior regulations. In or-
der for such rights to be recognized at least two factors must be present.
The regulations first require that a "legally binding conveyance,
lease, deed, contract or other document" exist, which authorizes surface
mining. 37 In accordance with the legislative history,38 such a document
must be interpreted according to custom and usage at the time and
place of conveyance. Moreover, there must be "a showing. . . that the
33. Id. § 522(a)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6).
34. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 95 (1977), reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 593, 63 1. While this explanation clarifies an otherwise confusing clause, it does not
completely eliminate the possibility that the exception will swallow the rule. One unresolved issue
involves the area of land exempted where a capital intensive investment occupies a small space or
is not site specific.
35. SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (Supp. I 1978).
36. Id.
37. 30 C.F.R. § 761.2 (1980).
38. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 95, reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 593, 631-32; S.H. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-95 (1977) (citing United States v.
Polino, 133 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. W.VA. 1955)).
1981]
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parties . . . actually contemplated a right to conduct the same . . .
mining activities for which the applicant claims a valid existing
right. ' 3
9
Second, the regulations require that those seeking to mine an area
obtain all necessary state and federal permits before August 3, 1977, or
"demonstrate to the regulatory authority that the coal is both needed
for, and immediately adjacent to, an on-going surface coal mining op-
eration for which all permits were obtained prior to August 3, 1977 . "40
This second requirement demonstrates that the "valid existing rights"
provision was designed to avoid the taking of property without just
compensation and that it should be construed accordingly. 41 A recent
federal court ruling has broadened the regulatory definition to include
situations where a good faith attempt was made to obtain all permits
before August 3, 1977.42
C. Procedures
1. Petitions
The primary mechanism for initiation of the designation proce-
dures under section 522(a)(2) and (3)43 is the petition process. The Act
provides that "any person having an interest which is or may be ad-
versely affected" may file a petition to have an area designated as un-
suitable for all or certain types of mining.44 The legislative history of
the Act45 indicates that "the phrase, 'any person having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected' shall be construed to be cotermi-
nous with the broadest standing requirements enunciated by the U.S.
Supreme Court."' 46 Thus, the OSM regulations governing the petition
39. 30 C.F.R. § 761.5(b)(2) (1980).
40. Id. § 761.5(a)(ii). The regulation further provides that
"Valid existing rights" does not mean mere expectation of a right to conduct surface
coal mining. . . . Examples of rights which alone do not constitute valid existing rights
include, but are not limited to, coal exploration permits or licenses, applications or bids
for leases, or where a person has only applied for a State or Federal permit.
Id. § 761.5(d).
41. 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 14,992 (1979). This interpretation is not unreasonable but is never-
theless subject to dispute. See United States v. Polino, 133 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.W.VA. 1955); 123
CONG. REc. H 3827 (daily ed. April 29, 1977).
42. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulations, 9 ELR 20720 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1979).
43. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
44. SMCRA § 722(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
45. H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 593, 626. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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process not only require the allegation of injury in fact,47 but they are
sufficiently broad to encompass injury to environmental, recreational,
and aesthetic interests as well as property and economic interests. 48
The petition must contain "allegations of facts with supporting ev-
idence which would tend to establish the allegations. 49 Exactly what
the petitioner must show is unclear. The OSM regulations cast further
confusion on the matter by allowing the regulatory authority to reject
petitions that are deemed "frivolous."5 It may be reasonably argued
that the use of language such as "frivolous" in a statutory scheme seek-
ing broad citizen participation is ill-advised, although it is not without
support in the legislative history.5 I There is no doubt, however, that
Congress intended to encourage citizen participation in the petition
process. This view is supported by SMCRA provisions that mandate
against comprehensive technical pleadings, which would discourage
citizen participation. 2
Once a petition has been accepted a permit may not be issued for
the pertinent land until final action has been taken by the regulatory
agency. An exception to the rule applies, however, if the petitioner
demonstrates that he has made "substantial legal and financial commit-
ments" relating to the proposed mining operations, and that such com-
mitments were made prior to January 1, 1977.11
47. 30 C.F.R. § 764.13(b)(5) (1980).
48. Person having an interest which is or may be adversely affected orperson with a valid legal
interest shall include any person-
(a) Who uses any resource of economic, recreational, esthetic, or environmental value
that may be adversely affected by coal exploration or surface coal mining and recla-
mation operations or any related action of the Secretary or the State regulatory
authority; or
(b) Whose property is or may be adversely affected by coal exploration or surface coal
mining and reclamation operations or any related action of the Secretary or the
State regulatory authority.
Id. § 700.5 (1980) (emphasis added).
49. SMCRA § 522(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c) (Supp. 11 1978).
50. 30 C.F.R. § 764.15(a)(3) (1980).
51. See H.R. REP. No. 128, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 94 (1977).
52. SMCRA §§ 102(i), 522(e)(4), 30 U.S.C. §§ 1202(i), 1272(e)(4) (Supp. 11 1978) (requiring
public notice and opportunity for public participation). One court has passed on the power of a
state to require that a § 522 petition contain more information than that required by 30 C.F.R.
§ 764(b) (1980). The Court stated:
This regulation protects the regulatory authority against frivolous petitions. It also pro-
tects the petitioner against overly burdensome informational requirements. Moreover,
the regulation does not prohibit a state regulatory authority from requiring additional
information that could affect the outcome of the petition.
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 14 ERC 1083, 1094 (D.D.C. 1980).
53. SMCRA § 522(a)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6) (Supp. 11 1978) (codified in 30 C.F.R.
§ 762.13(c) (1980); see notes 33 & 34 supra and accompanying text. Petitions must be received
before the end of the public comment period in order to stay permit issuance. Petitions received
1981]
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2. Public Hearing Requirement
The Act requires that a public hearing on the petition's proposed
designation be held within ten months after receipt of the petition.5 4
The hearing must be held in the locality of the affected area unless all
petitioners "stipulate agreement prior to the requested hearing, and
withdraw their request."'5" "Appropriate notice. . . of the date, time,
and location of such hearing" must be given, and "any person may
intervene by filing allegations of facts with supporting evidence which
would tend to establish the allegations. 56 The regulations indicate
that notice must be forwarded to all local, state, and federal agencies
having an interest in the decision, the petitioner and intervenors, and
all persons known by the regulatory authority to have real property
interests in any part of the area covered by the petition. 7 Two weekly
newspaper notices must be published four to five weeks before the
hearing to advise the general public of the pendency of proceedings. 8
The Act is silent with regard to the type of hearing required. The
regulations, however, provide for nonadjudicatory public hearings,
"legislative and fact-finding in nature, without cross-examination of
witnesses. '59 The OSM's decision to follow the legislative hearing
model was likely intended to avoid adjudicatory procedures which
would be inappropriate to local public participation where, for exam-
ple, cross-examination might "intimidate witnesses whose own experi-
ence might provide valuable information for the record."60
The entire fact-gathering mechanism set forth in section 522(a)(4)
of the Act6' supports the conclusion that such hearings should be infor-
mal rather than adjudicatory. The mechanism anticipates that the
agency will draw on internal and external resources to make in-
dependant judgments on designation, and that it will not merely act as
an impartial arbitrator between conservationists and mineral owners.62
In cases that have challenged the nonadjudicatory nature of the proce-
after this date may still preclude the issuance of permits for other lands within the area described
in the petition. 30 C.F.R. § 764.15(a)(7) (1980).
54. Id. § 522(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 30 C.F.R. § 764.17(b) (1980).
58. Id.
59. Id. § 764.17(a).
60. 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 15,004 (1979).
61. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a) (Supp. 1I 1980); see text accompanying notes 52-54 supra.
62. It must be recognized, however, that there are legitimate reasons for requiring adjudica-
tive procedures. The most persuasive of these is that the designation inquiry focuses on specific
[Vol. 16:418
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dures the agency's position has thus far been upheld.63
D. The Role of the State in the Designation Process
Perhaps the most confusing procedural aspect of section 522 is the
role of the state in the designation process. The Act indicates that land
designations must be made upon petition where reclamation is not fea-
sible64 or where the state chooses to apply the discretionary criteria. In
contrast, the Secretary of the Interior is required to "conduct a review
of Federal lands" to determine if there are areas unsuitable for surface
coal mining.6 5 It is unclear from the literal language of the Act whether
the state must conduct a similar review.
The state is also required to "establish a planning process enabling
objective decisions [to be made] based upon competent and scientifi-
cally sound. . . data as to which, if any, land areas of a state are un-
suitable for all or certain types of surface mining."66  In such a
planning process, the state must provide:
(A) a State agency responsible for surface coal mining lands
review;
(B) a data base and inventory system which will permit
proper evaluation of the capacity of different land areas of the
state to support and permit reclamation of surface coal min-
ing operations;
(C) a method or methods for implementing land use planning
decisions concerning surface coal mining operations; and
(D) proper notice, opportunities for public participation, in-
cluding a public hearing prior to making any designation or
redesignation ... .67
These statutory requirements indicate that the state should not
play a passive role in hearings. Rather, the "planning process" require-
ment implies that the state should actively direct attention to the future
impact of mining on the state as a whole, and not merely to the limited
issue of the effect of mining on petitioned acreage.
The preamble to the OSM regulations directs that information be
characteristics of specific lands, rather than on general policy considerations. Thus, it can be
argued that the decision requires the scrutiny of an adversarial proceeding.
63. In re Permanent Surface Mining Litigation, 9 ELR 20720 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1979).
64. SMCRA 522(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(2) (Supp. I 1978).
65. Id. § 522(b) 30 U.S.C. § 1272(b) (Secretary may permit surface coal mining on federal
lands prior to completion of review).
66. Id. § 522(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(1).
67. Id. § 522(a)(4), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(4).
1981]
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gathered "not only in response to petitions, but also in anticipation of
petitions."68 This requirement of present and anticipatory data collec-
tion and compilation thus provides the agency with an effective tool to
evaluate petitions, and also provides it with a comprehensive view of
the particular state's coal lands and resources. Additionally, this data
base and inventory system will ensure the availability of a vast body of
information on coal lands within the state69 for a comprehensive state
land use plan and for state use in initiating its own petitions under
section 522(c) of the SMCRA.7 °
E. The Role of the Secretary of the Interior in the Designation
Process
The Secretary's role in the designation process is more specific
with regard to federal lands. The Secretary has a duty to "conduct a
review of the federal lands to determine. . whether there are areas on
Federal lands which are unsuitable for all or certain types of surface
coal mining operations."'" Pursuant to this review, the Secretary is re-
quired to "withdraw" those lands which he determines to be unsuitable
for all or certain types of surface coal mining operations or condition
any lease or entry on those lands in a manner that will limit surface
coal mining on such lands.72 The Secretary's decision is subject to the
same petition process that applies to a state's determination on the use
of land for surface coal mining operations.7 3
III. SECTION 522 AND PENNSYLVANIA COAL CO. V. MAHON
United States Representative Morris Udall, the principal author of
the SMCRA, has admitted "some discomfort [in] undertaking to write
68. A "coal impact statement" must also be made prior to any designation. The statement
must describe "(i) the potential coal resources of the area, (ii) the demand for coal resources, and
(iii) the impact of such designation on the environment, the economy, and the supply of coal."
SMCRA § 522(d), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(d) (Supp. 11 1978).
69. 44 Fed. Reg. 14,902, 15,005 (1979). See also id at 14,998.
70. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c) (Supp. 11 1978). OSM regulations include federal, state, and local
governmental agencies in the definition of "person," thereby enabling the state to initiate a peti-
tion under the Act. 30 C.F.R. § 700.5 (1980). The state must also demonstrate, however, that is a
"person having an interest which is or may be adversely affected" by a determination of the regu-
latory authority. The data base and inventory system established by the OSM preamble will aid
the state in proving an adverse affect. Id.
71. SMCRA § 522(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(b) (Supp. I 1978) (Secretary required to make deter-
mination pursuant to applicable standards established in § 522(a)(2)-(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(2)-
(3) (Supp. I 1978).
72. SMCRA § 522(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(b) (Supp. 11 1978).
73. Id. § 522(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(c).
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[the SMCRA] with the admonitions of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon74 echoing in my ears."75 Nowhere in the Act do Justice
Holmes' words, "to make it commercially impractical to mine certain
coal has very nearly the same effect for consititutional purposes as ap-
propriating it," 6 echo more clearly than in section 522. The Supreme
Court, almost sixty years after Pennsylvania Coal, must now decide
whether a section 522 prohibition of all or certain types surface mining
in a given area amounts to a taking of private property without just
compensation. A further consequence of the Supreme Court's action
will likely be a long awaited clarification of Pennsylvania Coal's mean-
ing in constitutional jurisprudence. Hanging in the balance will be the
ability of federal and state governments to regulate surface mining
under the SMCRA.
As noted above, in the two cases now being appealed to the
Supreme Court,77 both trial courts held that section 522 violated the
fifth amendment taking prohibition. Moreover, both courts found that
Pennsylvania Coal was determinative on the taking issue.7 8 For this
reason, the facts and holding of Pennsylvania Coal will be examined
and compared with similar cases involving the application of section
522 of the SMCRA.
A. The Facts and Holding of Pennsylvania Coal
In 1921, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted what was commonly
known as the Kohler Act.7 9 That statute forbid the mining of anthra-
cite coal in such a way that would cause the subsidence of any public
building, street, road, bridge, or railroad tracks, factory, store, or any
private dwelling used for human habitation. 0
The Mahons, the plaintiffs in Pennsylvania Coal, owned the sur-
face of certain land on which their dwelling house was located, and the
Pennsylvania Coal Company, the defendant, owned the coal underly-
74. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
75. Udall, The Enactment of the Surface Mining ControlandReclamation Act of1977 in Retro-
spect, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 553, 557 (1979) (original footnote omitted) (new footnote added).
76. 260 U.S. at 414.
77. Andrus v. Indiana, No. 80-231 (S.D. IND., filed August 15, 1980), reprinted in 10 ELR
20613,prob.juris. noted, - U.S. ), 101 S. Ct. 67 (1980); Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation
Ass'n., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980),prob. juris noted, - U.S. -, I01 S. Ct. 67 (1980)
(Nos. 79-1538, 79-1596) (both parties appealed and cases were consolidated by the Court).
78. Andrus v. Indiana, 10 ENVIR. L. REPTR. at 20621; Virginia Surface Mining and Reclama-
tion Ass'n, Inc., 483 F. Supp. at 436-42.
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ing the Mahons' land. The Mahons' title derived from an 1878 convey-
ance by the Pennsylvania Coal Company to the Mahons' predecessor
in interest. Pennsylvania Coal Company reserved the right to remove
all coal under the tract, and the grantee took the premises subject to an
express waiver of all damage claims including any subsidence that
might be caused by the grantor's coal mining.8'
Relying on the Kohler Act, the Mahons subsequently sought to
enjoin the company's coal mining operations to the extent that such
mining would cause subsidence of their home. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act against the com-
pany's arguments that to limit mining would interfere with their con-
tractual rights, benefit private parties rather than the public, and
constitute a taking.82
A review of the argument later made by the Pennsylvania Coal
Company before the United States Supreme Court indicates that the
heart of the company's complaint was that the Kohler Act attempted to
protect the rights of a small group of private parties and was not legis-
lation intended to promote a broad public interest pursuant to the po-
lice power.8 3 The coal company therefore contended that the Act
"shows on its face that its purpose is not to protect the lives or safety of
the public generally but merely to augment the property rights of a
favored few."8 4
The company argued that the Kohler Act altered the bargained-
for contractual relationship between the coal and surface owners and
that the right to mine the underlying coal was, in effect, transferred by
the Act to the surface owner without compensation being paid to the
coal company. This allowed the purchaser of a severed surface estate,
who had been able to purchase land at a reduced price because the coal
rights had not been included, to obtain much more than he or she had
bargained and paid for. In contrast, the Mahons argued that "[tihe
protection of the life, health and safety of the public in the anthracite
mining communities [was] the primary purpose of the [A]ct. Its inter-
ference with property rights [was] merely incidental."8 6
The Supreme Court rejected the Mahons' contention that the
81. 260 U.S. at 412.
82. Id. at 394-404, 412.
83. 260 U.S. at 394-404.
84. Id. at 394-95.
85. Id. at 403.
86. Id. at 405 (citations omitted).
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Kohler Act was a legitimate exercise of the police power and held in
favor of the Pennsylvania Coal Company. Justice Holmes, speaking
for the Court, concluded:
This is the case of a single private house. . . A source
of damage to such a house is not a public nuisance even if
similar damage is inflicted on others in different places. The
damage is not common or public. ... The extent of the pub-
lic interest is shown by the statute to be limited, since the stat-
ute ordinarily does not apply to land when the surface is
owned by the owner of the coal. Furthermore, it is not justi-
fied as a protection of personal safety.
...So far as private persons or communities have seen
fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot
see that the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants
the giving to them of greater rights than they bought. 87
Despite Justice Brandeis' eloquent and oft cited dissent that the
Kohler Act was intended to protect the public health and welfare inci-
dent to a valid exercise of the police power, 88 it is clear that the Court
viewed Pennsylvania Coal as a case in which legislative power was used
to benefit private parties rather than to enhance public interests.
B. Constitutional Taking Law in General
Pennsylvania Coal did little to clarify the present-day law of tak-
ings.89 In a recent Supreme Court opinion, Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,9 0 Justice Brennan confessed that "this Court,
quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for deter-
mining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.' 9' Penn
Central does, however, cite Pennsylvania Coal with approval.
A taking analysis involves the application of a number of consid-
erations, each judicially developed under varying factual situations and
governmental activity.92 While the purpose of this article is not to cata-
logue the various taking theories or to derive from them the essence of
87. Id. 413-14, 416 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 416-22.
89. See note 79 infra.
90. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
91. Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
92. See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-28 (1979).
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the taking problem,93 an application of several of these theories to the
problem at hand is helpful. The foremost theories are:
1) the "diminution of value" theory,94 which had its genesis in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon;95
2) the "noxious use" theory,9 6 which was based on the hold-
ings of such cases as Hadacheck v. Sebastian97 and Mugler v.
Kansas;
98
3) the "distinct investment-backed expectations" theory,
which evolved from the "diminution of value" and "noxious
use" theories and which was first articulated in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City. 99
Specifically, the interaction between the "diminution of value" theory
and the "noxious use" theory presents the crux of the issue. The third
theory, however, described in Penn Central as the frustration of "dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations"" ° must also be examined.
C. Diminution of Value and Noxious Use Theories
1. Noxious Use
Justice Holmes relied on a diminution of value theory in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon' when he stated: "The general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'' 0 2 It must be
remembered, however, that the Pennsylvania Coal Court did not regard
the statute in question as an attempt to protect public interests through
the exercise of the police power, but rather as an unintentional legisla-
tive aid to private parties. 10 3 In indicating that in some circumstances
93. Many scholars have wrestled with the taking problem. See generally Binder, Taking Ver.
sus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA.
L. REV. 1 (1972). Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning (Making Room for
Robert Moses, William Zeckendorf, and a City Planner in the Same Community), 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 650, 663-69 (1958); Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or Invalid Taking?, 57
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1972); Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing Concepts ofLand as Prop-
erty, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 1039; McGinley, Prohibition of Surface Mining in West Virginia, 78 W.
VA. t. REV. 445, 463-74 (1976); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
94. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36, 48 (1964).
95. 260 U.S. at 412-16.
96. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 30, 50 (1964).
97. 239 U.S. 394, 404-14 (1915).
98. 123 U.S. 623, 664-73 (1887).
99. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
100. Id.
101. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
102. Id. at 415.
103. Id. at 412-16.
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the private property rights of individuals must yield to the police power
of the state, Justice Holmes stated: "[I]f the regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."'04
In some circumstances the Supreme Court has appeared to be rela-
tively unconcerned with diminution of value, especially where the
Government has sought to eliminate "noxious" or "harmful" uses of
property. For example, in Goldblat v. Hempstead °5 the Court upheld
a municipal ordinance which prohibited excavation below the water
table and which imposed, on those persons responsible for such opera-
tions, an affirmative duty to fill excavations already below the water
table. 0 6 The ordinance enjoined the appellants' sand and gravel min-
ing operations which had been active for many years. Faced with a
claim by appellants that the termination of ongoing operations consti-
tuted a taking, the Goldblatt Court reiterated the "noxious use" test set
forth in Mugler v. Kansas, and further indicated that even a "lawful
use" could be prohibited through a reasonable exercise of the police
power. 10 7  Accordingly, the ordinance was upheld. The Goldblatt
Court's treatment of the diminution of value problem should also be
noted. While indicating that a simple comparison of value before and
after governmental action is inconclusive, Goldblatt continued to rely
on Pennsylvania Coal when it stated the that "governmental action in
the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to constitute a taking
which constitutionally required compensation."'' 08
104. Id. at 415.
105. 369 U.S. 590 (1961). Accord, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 673 (1887).
106. 369 U.S. at 592.
107. Id. at 593. Butsee Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1977), where
the Court dispelled the notion that a use must be truly "noxious" to be eliminated without com-
pensation. In a footnote, Justice Brennan commented:
Appellants attempt to distinguish [Hadacheck, Miller and Goldblatt] on the ground
that, in each, the government was prohibiting a "noxious" use of land and that in the
resent case, in contrast, appellants' proposed construction above the [tierminal would
e beneficial. We observe that the use in issue in Hadacheck, Miller and Goldblatt were
perfectly lawful in themselves. They involved no "blameworthiness,. . . moral wrong-
doing or conscious act of risk taking which induce[d society] to shift the cost to a
pa[rt]icular individual.
Id. at 133-34 n.30 (citing Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 50 (1964)). The
Court continued: "These cases are better understood as resting not on any supposed 'noxious'
quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably re-
lated to the implementation of a policy. . . expected to produce a widespread public benefit and
applicable to all similarly situated property." Id.
108. 369 U.S. at 594. The Court did not examine diminution of value in Goldblatt because of
the absence of evidence in the record in support of a claim that the value of the appellants' prop-
erty had been reduced in value. The Court also noted that it was affording to the legislative
judgment "the usual presumption of constitutionality." Id.
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In cases in which the record established the presence of a nuisance
as well as a significant diminution of value, the Supreme Court has
upheld severe restrictions on the use of private property. In Hadacheck
v. Sebastian,19 the Court upheld a municipal ordinance which made it
unlawful to operate a brickyard in a residential area, despite the fact
that the ordinance effectively reduced the value of the plaintiff's prop-
erty from $800,000 to $60,000.1 10 The Court indicated that the reasona-
bleness of the city's concern for the health and comfort of its residents
justified the prohibition, the plaintiffs uncompensated loss notwith-
standing.'' Similar concerns have justified the upholding of other
governmental activities which resulted in substantial and uncompen-
sated losses of private property."12
A number of state courts have declined to consider the diminution
of value issue after they found that the legislature had sought to elimi-
nate harmful or socially undesirable activities through the exercise of
the police power. In Consolidated Rock Products v. City of Los Ange-
les,"3 the California Supreme Court directly confronted and rejected
the diminution of value theory and upheld a zoning restriction which
prohibited rock and gravel excavations on the plaintiff's property. The
California court emphasized the distinction between the police power
and the power of eminent domain." 4 In holding that the ordinance
was an exercise of the police power rather than an exercise of eminent
domain, the court accorded the regulation the same presumption of
constitutionality generally afforded legislative decisions." 5 Other state
courts have shown a similar reluctance to subject the public to harm in
order to protect private financial interests from diminution of value. "6
The cases and commentators suggest that a valid exercise of the
109. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
110. Id. at 405.
111. Id. at 414.
112. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 388-89 (1926).
113. 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal disrissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
114. Id. at 530-32, 370 P.2d at 351-52, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48. The court noted, however, that
the property might sustain a number of other uses, such as "stabling horses, cattle feeding and
grazing, chicken raising, [and] dog kennels". Id. at 530, 370 P.2d at 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647.
115. Id. at 346-47.
116. See, e.g., Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 72 Mass. 1303, 284 N.E.2d 891, 900
(1972). A more recent case demonstrating a state court's unwillingness to sacrifice the police
power in order to yield to substantial private financial interests is Commonwealth v. Barnes and
Tucker Co., 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461, appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1977). The court upheld,
against a taking challenge, an order which required Barnes and Tucker Co. to treat acid mine
drainage emanating from its inactive coal mine. The company failed to convince the court that
the remedy imposed was unduly oppressive. Id.
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police power, whether it takes the form of eliminating noxious or harm-
ful uses, limiting harmful "spillover" effects, or better determining the
appropriate uses for competing or interlocking property,1 17 should not
require compensability when greater public interests are at stake.
From this it also follows that a congressional prohibition of surface
mining in particular areas under section 522 of the SMCRA should be
deferentially upheld by courts.
2. Diminution of Value
The above conclusion sidesteps the issue of how the noxious use
theory compares with Pennsylvania Coal's emphasis on the diminution
of land value caused by SMCRA enforcement. Despite the logic and
weight of authority of the noxious use approach, the judicial response
has instead been to focus on the diminution of value theory. Moreover,
recent Supreme Court discussions on the just compensation issue dis-
pell any argument that Pennsylvania Coal is old or bad law. 1 8
Even in situations in which the Government acts to protect the
public from harmful land uses, courts often attempt to challenge such
legitimate exercises of police power by subjecting them to the diminu-
tion of value scale. The object, of course, is to determine whether the
Government's acts constitute a taking which constitutionally requires
compensation. One case in particular illustrates this point.
In Benenson v. United States,II9 the owner of the historic Willard
Hotel in Washington, D.C., brought an inverse condemnation suit al-
leging that the designation of the hotel as part of a Pennsylvania Ave-
nue historic site rendered the property completely valueless. The
Government had previously announced that the hotel would be con-
demned as part of the project but had for many years delayed condem-
nation proceedings, resulting in the unmarketability of the
subsequently vacated building under the threat of imminent condem-
nation. After several years elapsed without condemnation, the plain-
tiffs sought to demolish nonstructural parts of the building to determine
117. See generally Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971).
Professor Sax asserts that uses of property have effects that generally extend beyond legal property
lines and which result in intertwining property. Uses which "spill over" the borders of the user's
land may be prohibited without compensation. Id at 161. The spillover theory is broader and
more sophisticated than the noxious use theory, but clearly encompasses the latter. Professor
Sax's classic example of a spillover use is strip mining. Id at 152-55, 161, 170, 173.
118. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-67 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 174, 178 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127, 136-37. (1978).
119. 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
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whether it could be converted into an office building. The federal
agency directing the Pennsylvania Avenue Project responded by refus-
ing to allow the removal of the exterior features of the historic build-
ing.1
20
The United States Court of Claims held that the plaintiff's prop-
erty had been taken in contravention of the fifth amendment. After
quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the court concluded that the
"net effect of the acts of the Government is that the plaintiffs cannot
use their property for any income producing purpose; they cannot sell it
and thus far, the lack of congressional appropriations denies them com-
pensation for it.' 12 1
In the many cases in which restrictions on wetland filling and
dredging or gravel mining have been upheld under the police power,
courts have noted that there were other purposes for which the property
could be used. The existence of such uses after regulations have been
implemented leads courts to conclude that the plaintiff has not been
deprived of the total use of the property. 22 Unfortunately, both state
and federal courts often misapply this approach and mistakenly hold
that the Government cannot act in a manner that would render private
property unuseable for any lawful purpose.
The fifth amendment was never intended to place such restrictions
upon society's right to protect itself. 123 Such convoluted interpretations
of the just compensation clause are premised upon a misconception of
120. Id at 941-46.
121. Id at 947.
122. Seegenerally South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 678 (1st Cir. 1974); Brecciarole
v. Conn. Comm'r of Envt'I Prot., 362 A.2d 948, 951 (Conn. 1975); Turnpike Realty v. Town of
Dedham, 72 Mass. 1303,-, 284 N.E.2d 891, 899 (1972); State v. A. Capuano Bros., Inc., 384 A.2d
610, 614-15 (R.I. 1978); State Dept. of Ecology v. Pacesetter Const. Co., 571 P.2d 196, 199 (Wash.
1977). See also Bureau of Mines of Md. v. George's Creek Coal & L. Co., 272 Md. 143, -, 321
A.2d 748, 765 (Md. 1974), where a holding company was the owner of mineral rights underlying
state owned land. A Maryland statute was enacted prohibiting surface mining on any land owned
by the State of Maryland unless the prohibition would amount to a taking and public funds were
unavailable to provide compensation. The Lessee of George's Creek was prohibited from mining
pursuant to the statute.
In reviewing the circuit court's finding that the prohibition resulted in a taking of property
without just compensation, the Maryland court found that the prohibition was clearly within the
police power because it was "calculated to protect the environment and to preserve State-owned
land for public use for present and future generations of citizens." Id at 765. Nevertheless, in
attempting to comply with the holdings of Pennsylvania Coal and Goldblat, the court remanded
the case for a determination on whether the owner had been deprived of all reasonable use of his
property. Id at 766.
123. Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66 n.6 (1979); Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426
U.S. 668, 674 n.8 (1977); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 127-30.
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Pennsylvania Coal. That case simply did not involve noxious uses or
other public nuisance type activities.
D. Taking Law Applied to the Severed Mineral Estate
Where a tract of land is owned in fee, a prohibition of coal mining
under section 522 would still allow the land to be put to other lawful
uses, thus negating a possible taking challenge. In some instances,
however, a governmental prohibition against surface coal mining may
render the mineral interest valueless. In this context, the most difficult
taking question thus involves the effect of use prohibitions on such a
single use property interest.
Assume, for example, the existence of a situation in which the in-
terest holder owns only the coal and that because of a shallow overbur-
den the coal can only be mined by surface mining methods. To
prohibit mining of such coal under section 522 of the SMCRA would
appear to deprive the coal estate owner of any lawful use of that prop-
erty interest. 24 Nevertheless, this conclusion is subject to qualification.
As long as the coal is owned by the plaintiff, there is a possibility that
technological advancements will make extraction of the coal profitable
through other extractive methods that will not violate SMCRA provi-
sions.' 25 Moreover, for certain SMCRA prohibitions, the designation
is subject to termination upon the introduction of new evidence.' 26
Finally, as Congress has indicated, "the designation of unsuitabil-
ity will not necessarily result in a prohibition of mining. The designa-
tion can merely limit specific types of mining and thus the coal resource
may still be extracted by a mining technology which would protect the
values upon which the designation is premised."' 27 Because the plain-
tiff bears the burden of proving the absence of other possible uses,' 28
124. This was the rationale in Midland Electric Coal v. Knox County, 1 Ill. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d
275 (1953), where the court struck down a zoning ordiance prohibiting the use of land for the
recovery of coal by strip mining. Id at--, 115 N.E.2d at 287. The court reasoned: "Zoning that
prevents mining has the effect of prohibiting any use at all of mineral property. Authorization to
use the surface for farming purposes provides no use for the mineral property beneath it." Id at
-, 115 N.E.2d at 283.
125. Certain coal seams once thought unmineable, for example, can be tapped by a process of
igniting the coal seam in place and tapping the combustible gas produced. This process is known
as in sifu gasification.
126. SMCRA § 522(a)(2)-(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(2)-(3) (Supp. 111978). Section 522(e) desig-
nations by Act of Congress are not subject to later re-evaluation. 30 C.F.R. § 764.13(c) (1980).
127. See H.R. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 94, reprintedin [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 593, 631.
128. Bureau of Mines of Md. v. George's Creek Coal and Land Co., 272 Md. 143, -, 321 A.2d
748, 766 (1974); State v. A. Capuano Bros. Inc., 384 A.3d 610, 615 (R.I. 1978).
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the prospect that the prohibition will be reevaluated and subsequently
terminated or that section 522 prohibitions will not preclude all mining
methods may alone provide a sufficient basis for courts to reject a tak-
ing challenge. Assuming for the moment, however, that the coal in
question is rendered unmineable because of the section 522 designa-
tion, several cogent arguments may still support the uncompensated
prohibition of coal mining.
The Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Penn Central 29
provides support for such a view. Penn Central, it should be recounted,
involved a controversy over the proposed construction of a high rise
office building anchored upon and rising above the Grand Central Ter-
minal. Pursuant to New York's Landmarks Preservation Law, 30 the
Landmarks Preservation Commission had designated the terminal a
"landmark" and the city tax block it occupied a "landmark site." Be-
cause the station had been designated a landmark, the commission de-
nied Penn Central permission to construct the office building. 131
The facts in Penn Central are quite different from those relating to
the prohibition of surface mining. The greatest difference is that the
SMCRA attempts to protect the public from noxious uses or nuisances
created by surface mining, while the New York law attempted to regu-
late land use in the absence of a nuisance or noxious use. An analysis
of the Court's opinion is helpful, however, because the thrust of Penn
Central's argument focused upon the diminution of value theory.
1. The Severed Mineral Estate and the Single Use Anomaly
Penn Central reiterated the principle that governmental action
promoting the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the public is per-
missible "even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the prop-
erty."' 32  Therefore, as indicated above, the owner of a valuable
mineral estate may be prohibited from mining that mineral without
compensation simply because the property can still be used for other
purposes. Thus, the owner is not deprived of all profitable land use.
On the other hand, if one were to carry the diminution of value
129. 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
130. NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 8A, § 207-20(a)(1976).
131. The New York ordinance provided that owners of such landmarks could be compensated
by the transfer of development rights. Penn Central was granted such rights by the Landmarks
Preservation Commission. The Supreme Court, however, declined to decide whether such a
mechanism constituted just compensation. 438 U.S. at 122.
132. I at 125.
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argument to its logical conclusion, the owner of a coal seam who owns
only the mineral rights could not be prohibited from mining, for there
would be no other use to which he could put the coal. Consequently,
by purchasing the coal and not the surface, the severed mineral estate
owner acquires a guaranteed right to mine the coal, even though such
mining may cause harm to the public.
In short, the diminution of value focus upon the available uses of
divided property interests leads to an anomaly: one who purchases
less, in effect, will receive more constitutional protection. Even if min-
ing a tract would cause landslides, downstream flooding, or water pol-
lution, this argument would preclude governmental prohibition of such
harmful mining activity unless compensation were paid. 33 The result
is absurd-but one logically flowing from the diminution of value the-
ory applied to a severed mineral estate.
2. Penn Central and the Problem of Segmented Real Property
Penn Central deals to some degree with the problem of segmented
real property interests. Penn Central had argued that the landmarks
law deprived it of any gainful use of the air rights above the terminal.
The Court responded:
Apart from our own disagreement with Appellant's character-
ization of the effect of the New York City Law. . . ,the sub-
mission that appellants may establish a "taking" simply by
showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a
property interest that they heretofore had believed was avail-
able for development is quite simply untenable. Were this the
rule, this Court would have erred not only in upholding laws
restricting the development of air rights . . . but also in ap-
proving those prohibiting both the subadjacent, . . . and the
lateral . . . development of particular parcels. Taking juris-
prudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments
and attempt to determine whether rights in aparticular segment
have been entirely abrogated.'34
This statement, reminiscent of Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 35 suggests that one cannot establish a compensa-
133. The SMCRA was enacted to protect the public from such hazards. See SMCRA
§ 101(c)-(d), (e), (h), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c)-(d), (e), (h) (Supp. 11 1978).
134. 438 U.S. at 130 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
135. If we are to consider the value of the coal kept in place by the restriction, we should
compare it with the value of all other parts of the land. That is, with the value not of the
coal alone, but with the value of the whole property. The rights of an owner as against
the public are not increased by dividing the interests in his property into surface and
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ble taking by showing that the ability to exploit a subsurface property
interest has been completely abrogated.'36
3. Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central: The Destruction of
Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
It can also be argued that the anomaly created by applying a de-
struction of value test to a "single-use" segment of property suggests a
result inconsistent with actual expectations. Penn Central's focus on
the parties' expectations suggests a second line of analysis. Besides pro-
viding a rather comprehensive review of the law of taking,137 Penn Cen-
tral is particularly significant in its treatment of Pennsylvania Coal:
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon ...is the leading case
for the proposition that a state statute that substantially fur-
thers important public policies may so frustrate distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations as to amount to a "taking". There
the claimant had sold the surface rights to the particular par-
cels of property, but expressly reserved the right to remove the
coal thereunder. A Pennsylvania statute, enacted after the
transactions, forbade any mining of coal that caused the sub-
sidence of any house, unless the house was the property of the
owner of the underlying coal and was more than 150 feet
from the improved property of another. Because the statute
made it commercially impracticable to mine the coal, ...
and thus had nearly the same efect as the complete destruction
of rights claimant had reservedfrom the owners of the surface
land, .. .the Court held that the statute was invalid as ef-
fecting a "taking" without just compensation.' 38
subsoil. The sum of the rights in the parts can not be greater than the rights in the whole.
The estate of an owner in land is grandiloquently described as extending ab orco u1sque
ad coelum. But I suppose no one would contend that by selling his interest above one
hundred feet from the surface he could prevent the State from limiting, by the police
power, the height of structures in a city. And why should a sale of underground rights
bar the State's power? For aught that appears the value of the coal kept in place by the
restriction may be negligible as compared with that part of it which is represented by the
coal remaining in place and which may be extracted despite the statute. 260 U.S. at 419
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). In Bureau of Mines of Md. v. George's Creek Coal & L. Co.,
272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (1974), the court considered the effect of prohibiting surface
mining on land use as a whole rather than upon the limited mineral estate. Id at -, 321
A.3d at 766. See also American Dredging Co. v. Dept. of Envt'l Prot., 161 N.J. Super.
504, 391 A.2d 1265 (1978).
136. In Penn Central there had been no legal severance of air rights from the fee interest. This
distinction seems irrelevant, however, since the existence of segmented interests within a fee is
judicially recognized. Air rights, like subsurface rights, can be severed and sold for substantial
value. See N.Y. Times, June 10, 1979, § I, at I, col. 1.
137. 438 U.S. at 123-28.
138. Id at 127-28 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In its discussion of "distinct invest-
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The particular unfairness which the Court refused to permit in Penn-
sylvania Coal clearly appears in this description. It was not the fact
that the coal owner could not profit from the coal that frustrated
his distinct investment-backed expectations. Rather, the frustration
stemmed from Government action which, pursuant to statute, at-
tempted to readjust property rights between the private parties to the
transaction.
The question arises whether a coal seam purchase creates invest-
ment-backed expectations. Reflecting on Pennsylvania Coal, it appears
that the mere purchase of the coal was not the "investment" which the
Court sought to protect. Instead, it was the concreteness of the expecta-
tions that rendered it unfair to prohibit mining. The coal owner in
Pennsylvania Coal crystallized its expectations in a deed under which
those who could have been protected by purchasing the right to
subadjacent support knowingly waived that protection. Moreover, the
Kohler Act was not a legitimate exercise of the police power because it
sought to protect private rather than public interests.
The expectations issue takes on an entirely different hue when it
arises from a bilateral transaction which ignores valid rights held by
others. Pennsylvania Coal clearly does not stand for the proposition
that a coal owner can solidify rights between himself and the public at
large by using a bilateral coal deed granting only the right to mine coal
and to remove the surface in the process. Coal mining activities may
intrude upon the property interests of adjacent property owners, hold-
ers of riparian water rights, and the rights of the public. Such rights
were clearly not paid for in acquiring the mining rights.' 3 9 In such
cases the police power may be legislatively invoked without regard to
the impact on private contractual rights.
An expectation of the right to exploit property at the expense of
others, not parties to the transaction, is not entitled to constitutional
protection when the public may be harmed by the exercise of such
rights. It has long been established that rights subject to state restric-
tion cannot be removed from the State's jurisdiction merely by incorpo-
rating those rights into a contract.
ment-backed expectations", the Court in Penn Central referred to Professor Michelman's seminal
article on takings in which he discussed "distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment,
backed expectations." Id at 128 (citing Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness.: Comments on
the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1229-34 (1967)).
139. See Reitze, OldKing Coalandthe Merry Rapists ofAppalachia, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
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E. Section 522 and the Virginia and Indiana Challenges
In both Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association v. An-
drus and Indiana v. Andrus, United States district courts deemed sec-
tion 522 an unconstitutional taking. The Indiana case, citing
Pennsylvania Coal, did so somewhat casually, stating merely that the
prohibition of coal mining "destroys the mineral interest and the own-
er's rights."4 In the Virginia case the Court held simply that section
522 "is clearly a physical restriction against the removal of coal and
furthermore, requires a total loss of profit opportunity. ..
Both cases relied exclusively on Pennsylvania Coal as precedent for
their holdings. Neither case examined the congressional purposes un-
derlying section 522, nor did they undertake a review of just compensa-
tion principles.
F. Section 522 is a Valid Exercise of the Police Power
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon has been interpreted by courts in
various ways. It has been incorrectly discussed in contexts in which a
government regulation has been enacted to protect the public from nui-
sances, noxious uses, and other types of harmful or hazardous activi-
ties. Section 522 of the SMCRA, enacted to prevent or ameliorate
harm to public interests flowing from surface mining, is typical of regu-
lations which are undesirably burdened by Pennsylvania Coal. It is
hoped that the Supreme Court, when reviewing the SMCRA in the In-
diana and Virginia cases, will correct these previous judicial misappli-
cations of Pennsylvania Coal to legislative enactments that are correctly
intended to protect the public from harmful land use activities. When
Congress or a state legislature enacts a statute to protect the public
health or welfare from harmful land use activities, private economic
interests should be subsumed to the larger good. To the extent that
courts have relied on Pennsylvania Coal to find takings in cases in
which statutes or ordinances were enacted to protect the public welfare
from harm created by private activities, those courts were wrong. Penn-
sylvania Coal was not a case in which a statute was found to advance a
significant public interest. Rather, it was one in which legislation pur-
portedly enacted under the guise of the police power was actually di-
rected toward promoting private interests. Thus, the diminution of
value theory is relevant only in cases like Pennsylvania Coal where the
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public interest advanced by legislation is not significant and the con-
comitant impact on private rights is great.
The fifth amendment was never intended to be an obstacle to gov-
ernmental regulation, especially in situations where private activity cre-
ates the possibility of harm to important public interests. Activities
which a legislature finds may harm the public can be completely pro-
hibited even though those regulated may suffer great financial loss. A
lower court recently upheld the SMCRA against a fifth amendment
attack, and quite correctly emphasized that:
[T]he Surface Mining Act is directed at the public purpose of
eliminating the spillover effects of surface mining which bur-
den interstate commerce. Although the owner of the surface
rights or his successor in interest may benefit from the Act, he
is neither the sole nor the principal beneficiary. The principal
beneficiary is the public. The Supreme Court has said,
"where the public interest is involved, preferment of that in-
terest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent
even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing character-
istics of every exercise of the police power which affects prop-
erty."142
There can be no doubt that section 522 of the SMCRA was en-
acted pursuant to the commerce clause as a police power measure.
Therefore, section 522 should not be subject to the theoretical limita-
tions imposed by the diminution of value analysis. Instead, this section
should be afforded the same presumption of constitutionality that other
police power measures are given. It should be struck down only if its
challengers can meet the heavy burden of proving that Congress had no
rational basis for enacting such a provision or that there was no ra-
tional nexus between the means utilized by the statute and the end
sought to be achieved.
142. Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, 14 ERC 1325, 1332 (D. Iowa (1980)) (citing Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928)). In Star Coal, the court distinguished the SMCRA from the statute
challenged in Pennsylvania Coal. The Court stated:
The legislation served no public purpose and instead was directed at a private pur-
pose of benefiting principally those living in the dwelling, that the legislation deprived
the coal mining company, which had originally owned the land in fee, of its reserved
subsurface mineral rights, and that the legislation abrogated the right to contract by
gving the house dweller more than he bargained for while depriving the coal miner of
is bargain.
In Pennsylvania Coal, the surface owner benefited if mining was prohibited. In contrast, this is not
necessarily the case with prohibitions under Section 522. It is not at all unusual, for example, for a
surface owner to lease coal mining rights in return for a per ton royalty. In these instances, the
obvious and only beneficiary of a prohibition would be the public-who would be protected from
the harms and hazards found by Congress to arise from mining in certain areas.
1981]
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G. Takings Problems in the Application of Section 522
One may conclude that the designation of certain areas as unsuita-
ble for surface mining does not run afoul of the fifth amendment prohi-
bition against the taking of property without just compensation.
Section 522 as applied, however, provides for a mining prohibition in a
multiplicity of situations and for varying reasons. Further constitu-
tional questions can thus arise.1 43
The types of designation most likely to be unsuccessfully chal-
lenged arise under section 522(a)(2), which requires the designation of
an area to be "unsuitable for all or certain types of surface mining op-
erations if the State Regulatory authority determines that reclamation
pursuant to the requirements of the Act is not technologically and eco-
nomically feasible."' 44 This type of prohibition depends on a legisla-
tive determination that unreclaimed surface mines are in essence
nuisances. 45 As discussed above, the prohibition of a noxious use is
clearly within the police power, notwithstanding the diminution in
value of private interests and even though compensation is not dis-
143. The Court, for example, in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 14
ERC 1083 (D.D.C. 1980), found persuasive the argument of the Secretary of Interior that the
SMCRA "purports to advance a public interest. . . the Court in Mahon recognized the Penn-
sylvania statute reflected a limited public interest." Id at -. Nevertheless, the court declined to
decide the taking issue because it was premature. The district court stated:
The Court noted in Penn Central that whether a particular restriction will be ren-
dered invalid by the Government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it
depends largely upon the particular circumstances [in that] case. Herein the plaintiffs'
claim is hypothetical; they have presented the court with no specific circumstances en-
abling the Court to adjudicate this issue. Since no party can complain of an unconstitu-
tional taking, we decline to address the constitutionality ...
Id at-.
144. SMCRA § 522(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1978).
145. Section 101. The Congress finds and declares that-.
(c) Many surface mining operations result in disturbances of surface areas that burden
and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare by destroying or diminishing
the utility of land for commercial, industrial, residential, recreational, agricultural,
and forestry purposes, by causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to floods, by
polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitats, by impairing natural
beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards 
dangerous to lfe
and property, by degrading the quality of life in local communities, and by counter-
acting governmental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and other natural
resources;
(h) there are a substantial number of acreas of land throughout major regions of the
United States disturbed by surface and underground coal on which little or no recla-
mation was conducted, and the impacts from these unreclaimed lands impose social
and economic costs on residents in nearby and adjoining areas as well as continuing
to impair environmental quality
Id § 101(c), (I), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(c), (h) (Supp. 11 1978).
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pensed. 146
It follows that designations of certain areas as unsuitable for speci-
fied mining operations, especially natural hazard lands where the oper-
ations would "subsequently endanger life and property,"' 47 should
likewise encounter no constitutional difficulties. Mining on natural
hazard lands, such as "areas subject to frequent flooding and areas of
unstable geology," also fall clearly within the holdings of the noxious
use and nuisance cases.14 8 Applications of the other discretionary crite-
ria of section 522(a)(3) 149 may be more problematic. Lands may be
designated and protected as "fragile lands" pursuant to this section.150
One need look no further than the spate of litigation surrounding
the prohibition of various dredge and fill operations in wetland and
coastal estuary areas to appreciate the controversy attending a mining
prohibition in such areas.' 5' This litigation has yielded conflicting re-
sults and the question is by no means closed. More recent decisions,
however, tend to uphold legislative efforts designed to protect such
fragile areas.'5 2 The significant public interest in protecting such areas
146. See text accompanying note 143 supra. But see Midland Electric Coal Corp. v. Knox
County, I Il. 2d 200, 115 N.E.2d 275 (1953). The Midland Electric court noted:
The record further fails to disclose any substantial relationship between the prohibi-
tion of strip mining and the preservation of the community's public health, either as to
water resources, drainage, lateral support of roads, noxious fumes or odors, weeds,
drownings, predatory animals or other elements involved in public health and safety.
Id at 210, 115 N.E.2d at 281. See also Smith v. Juillerate, 161 Ohio St. 424, 119 N.E.2d 611
(1954) (zoning prohibiting strip mining in residential area upheld).
147. See, e.g., SMCRA § 522(a)(3)(D), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(D) (Supp. 11 1978).
148. See, e.g., Turnpike Realty v. Town of Dedham, 72 Mass. 1303, 284 N.E.2d 891, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1972); Maple Leaf Investors v. State Dep't of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726,
565 P.2d 1162 (1977) (flood control zoning upheld as a valid exercise of the police power).
149. SMCRA § 522(a)(3)(B)-(C), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(B)-(C) (Supp. 11 1978).
150. Id § 522(a)(3)(B), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(3)(B).
151. See generally Dooley v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm. of Fairfield, 151 Conn. 304,
197 A.2d 770 (1964); McGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 349
(1970); Comm'r of Natural Resources v. S. Volpe & Co., 344 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965);
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Md. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of
Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Spears v. Berle, 63 A.D.2d 372, 407
N.Y.S.2d 590 (1978).
152. Severe land use restrictions for the preservation of wetlands were upheld in Turner v.
County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972); Candlestick Properties Inc. v.
San Francisco Bay Consv'n & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970);
Brecciaroli v. Conn. Comm'r of Envir. Protection, 168 Conn. 349, 362 A.2d 948 (1975); Pope v.
City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331, 249 S.E.2d 16 (1978); Potomac Sand and Gravel Co. v. Governor of
Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); Turn-
pike Realty v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221,284 N.E.2d 891 (1972); Sibson v. State, 115 N.H.
124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975); American Dredging Co. v. State Dep't of Environmental Protection, 161
N.J. Super. 504, 391 A.2d 1265 (1978); Sands Point Harbor v. Sullivan, 136 N.J. Super. 436, 346
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from the harms accompanying surface mining is clearly sufficient to
uphold the constitutionality of section 522(a)(3).
The mining prohibition in historic areas may also give rise to con-
troversy, particularly in light of the prior case law surrounding historic
preservation.1 53 In Penn Central, the Court goes a considerable dis-
tance in resolving not only the issue of historic preservation, but also
the broader issue regarding the extent of the police power to regulate
primarily for the preservation of aesthetic values.154
Finally, it must be remembered that while a taking issue does exist
under section 522(a), extreme unfairness to individuals is avoided by
the operation of the grandfather clause, 55 which prevents the termina-
tion of operations in existence or for which "substantial legal and
financial commitments" had been made prior to January 4, 1977.156
Section 522(e), which designates certain lands as unsuitable "by
Act of Congress," also raises constitutional issues in its various applica-
tions. These issues cannot be avoided merely because the section con-
tains a savings clause exempting from designation any areas where the
operator is found to possess "valid existing rights".'57 An example of
the problems attending the application of section 522(e) is the prohibi-
tion of surface mining "which will adversely affect any publicly owned
A.2d 612 (1975); State v. A. Capuano Bros., 384 A.2d 610 (R.I. 1978); Maple Leaf Investors v.
State Department of Ecology, 88 Wash. 2d 726, 565 P.2d 1162 (1977).
The most noteworthy wetlands case is Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d
761 (1972). In Just, the Court emphasized the value of property in its natural state, rather than the
potential value of the property if used to suit the owner's wishes. Most courts upholding the
constitutionality of wetland restrictions focused on the loss of value resulting from the owner's
inability to use the property, but the court in Just rejected this approach:
The Justs argue their property has been severly depreciated in value. But this de-
preciation of value is not based on the use of the land in its natural state but on what the
land would be worth if it could be filled and used for the location of a dwelling. While
loss of value is to be considered in determining whether a restriction is a constructive
taking, value based upon changing the character of the land at the expense of harm to
public rights is not an essential factor or controlling.
Id at -, 201 N.W.2d at 771. For a discussion of wetlands valuation, see Binder, Taking Versus
Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L.
REV. 1, 18-20 (1972).
153. See 438 U.S. at 104; Berenson v. United States, 548 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Lafayette
Park Baptist Church v. Scott, 553 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. 1977).
154. 438 U.S. at 129 (land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life) (citing
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50
(1976); Village of Bell Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Bermon v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954);
Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909)). In Berman, the Supreme Court noted that [t]he concept of
the public welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it represents are spiritual as well as
physical, aesthetic as well as monetary." 348 U.S. at 33 (citation omitted).
155. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
156. SMCRA § 522(a)(6), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(a)(6) (Supp. I 1978).
157. Id. § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e); see text accompanying notes 32-38 supra.
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park or certain historic sites."' 8
Preventing property from being surface mined because it will spoil
a park view is arguably nothing more than governmental acquisition of
additional parkland. Conceptually, the problem under these circum-
stances is best explained by a theory espoused in 1964 by Professor
Joseph Sax.' 59 Sax contends that when the Government acts as a medi-
ator between conflicting property interests, choosing one over the other,
it need not compensate.' 60 But, when the Government acts in its enter-
prise capacity, "in which the government acquires resources for its own
account," it must compensate.
161
Creating parks is certainly an enterprise function of government
and under the Sax theory must be paid for.' 62 Following this line of
thought, several state cases have held that restrictions on property are
compensable when they effectively turned private property into park-
land. 63  In analyzing a section 522(e) prohibition of this nature, the
type of "adverse effect" on a park or historic site may be determinative.
If the alleged "adverse effect" is water or air pollution, noise pollution,
or other similar nuisance infringements on the right of park or historic
site users, then a prohibition should clearly be upheld. If, however, the
alleged adverse effect is purely aesthetic, then a more difficult problem
is presented.
Legislative protection of the public from aesthetic harms may be
ripe for a due process attack on the grounds that substantive standards
158. Id § 522(e)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(3) (Supp. I 1978).
159. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
160. Id at 61-76.
161. Id at 62.
162. Id at 63.
163. In Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), private parks within an apartment development were rezoned as areas
open to the public "in which only passive recreational uses [were] permitted." Id at -, 350
N.E.2d at 384, 385 N.Y.S. at 7. The owners were able to challenge successfully the city's action by
claiming that the zoning ordinance was an unreasonalbe exercise of the police power. Id at -,
350 N.E.2d at 386, 385 N.Y.S. at 11. A similar dispute arose in Morris County Land Improvement
Co. v. Township of Parasippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). In that case, the
plaintiff's property was classified as a "meadows development zone." Id at -, 193 A.2d at 236.
Land uses on that land were required to be in harmony with the natural state or use of the land.
The plaintiffs landfill operations were therefore prohibited under the statute. The court, in apply-
ing the diminution of value approach, held for the plaintiff on the theory that the designation
amounted to a taking.
[I]t will be noted that any of the previously listed permitted uses in the zone are public or
quasi-public in nature,. . . i.e., outdoor recreational uses to be operated only by some
governmental unit, conservation uses and activities, township sewage treatment plants
and water facilities and public utility transmission lines, substations and radio and televi-
sion transmitting stations and towers.
Id at -, 193 A.2d at 240.
1981]
30
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 16 [1980], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol16/iss3/2
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:418
for determining exactly what constitutes aesthetic harm must be estab-
lished. 14 It cannot be doubted that, in many situations, what is beauti-
ful to some is offensive to others. This attack may be rebutted,
however, by the argument that a congressional determination of when
strip mining adversely affects parks or historic sites compels that viola-
tions be remedied by an exercise of the police power despite the dimi-
nution of value of the mineral owner's interest.
The aesthetic value problem can be narrowed to a question of
proof. If the Government can show that mining may cause an "adverse
effect," as that term is used in section 522(e)(3), then it properly may be
prohibited. It is obvious, moreover, that there is a substantial distinc-
tion between the effects of enforcing section 522(e)(3) and the effects of
other types of mining regulations. In most instances, the prohibition of
surface mining limits only one use of a fee simple estate. Section 522
does not turn a potential minesite into parkland if the property may
still be used for farming or other purposes. 65 If surface mining could
be prohibited for the protection of adjacent properties and the public
under the police power, it should also be legitimate to prohibit surface
mining for the purpose of protecting a park. 166
164. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
165. SMCRA § 522(a)(e)(e); 30 U.S.C. § 1272 (a)(3)(c)(Supp. 11 1978). The single-use prop-
erty issue may nevertheless present a problem. See text accompanying notes 95-104 supra.
166. It is significant that Professor Sax himself may have retreated from the distinction he
earlier drew between entrepreneurs and mediators. In a later article, Sax concludes that uses of
property which "spill over" beyond the borders of the user's land may be prohibited without
compensation. Sax, Takings Private Property andPublic Rights, 81 Yale L.J. 149, 152-55, 161, 172-
74. As seen in this light, land owners should not be compensated for legislation protecting public
parks from surface mining operations.
Where federal parkland is concerned, the property clause of the United States Constitution
provides protection where traditional police power is unavailable. This applies when jurisdiction
over private inholdings has not been ceded by the state to the federal government under U.S.
CoNsT art. I, § 8, cl. 17, or where the land sought to be regulated lies outside the boundaries of the
national parkland in question. Under the property clause, the federal government has authority
analogous to the police power to regulate private lands for the limited purpose of protecting feder-
ally owned lands. See United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1927); Camfield v. United
States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897). See also Kleppe, Secretary of the Interior v. New Mexico, 426
U.S. 529 (1976). For a discussion of the problem of protecting national parks from intrusive uses
on private lands that are near or within park boundaries, see Sax, Helpless Giants- The National
Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MIcH. L. REv. 239 (1977).
Generally, Section 522(e) of the SMCRA prohibits surface mining that would disrupt federal
parks. That section prohibits surface mining:
(1) on any lands within the boundaries of units of the National Park System, the Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge Systems, the National Systems, the National System of Trails,
the National Wilderness Preservation System, the Wild and Scenic Rivers System,
including study rivers designated under Section 1276(a) of Title 16 and National Rec-
reation Areas designated by Act of Congress;
(2) on any Federal lands within the boundaries of any national forest; Provided, how-
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The protection of pristine areas from the harmful environmental
effects of surface mining surely falls within the purview of the police
power. Yet, under the presumption of constitutionality accorded to
legislative determinations, it is difficult to argue that Congress acted
arbitrarily or irrationally in prohibiting strip mining in national parks.
This is particularly true in light of the great potential for environmental
harm which Congress found might result from such mining activities.
When outstanding national resources such as national wilderness areas
and parks are at stake, Congress should be afforded considerable lee-
way in protecting them from potential harm.
With few exceptions, section 522(e)(2) prohibits surface mining
within the boundaries of any national forest.'67 Although the Kohler
Act's prohibition of coal mining related subsidence of public buildings,
highways, and the like was an absolute prohibition, the mining prohibi-
tion within any national forest is not absolute.
Section 522(e)(2) permits surface mining in national forests if the
Secretary of the Interior finds:
that there are no significant recreational, timber, economic, or
other values which may be incompatible with such surface
mining operations and-
ever, That surface coal mining operations may be permitted on such lands if the
Secretary finds that there are no significant recreational, timber, economic, or other
values which maybe incompatible with such surface mining operations and-
(A) surface operations and impacts are incident to an underground coal mine; or
(B) where the Secretary of Agriculture determines, with respect to lands which do
not have significant forest cover within those national forests west of the 100th
meridian, that surface mining is in compliance with the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960, the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, the Na-
tional Forest Management Act of 1976, and the provisions of this chapter: And
providedfurther, That no surface coal mining operations may be permitted within
the boundaries of the Custer National Forest;
(3) which will adversely affect any publicly owned park or places included in the Na-
tional Register of Historic Sites unless approved jointly by the regulatory authority
and the Federal, State, or local agency with jurisdiction over the park or the historic
site;
(4) within one hundred feet of the outside right-of-way line of any public road, except
where mine access roads or haulage roads join such right-of-way line and except
that the regulatory authority may permit such roads to be relocated or the area
affected to lie within one hundred feet of such road, if after public notice and op-
portunity for public hearing in the locality of a written finding is made that the
interests of the public and the landowners affected thereby will be protected; or
(5) within three hundred feet from any occupied dwelling, unless waived by the owner
thereof, nor within three hundred feet of any public building, school, church, com-
munity, or institutional building, public park, or within one hundred feet of a ceme-
tery.
SMCRA § 522(e)(l)-(5), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(l)-(5) (Supp. II 1978).
167. Id § 522(e)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(2).
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(A) surface operations and impacts are incident to an
underground mine; or
(B) where the Secretary of Agriculture determines, with
respect to lands which do not have significant forest
cover within those national forests west of the 100th
meridian, that surface mining is in compliance with
the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, the
Federal Coal Leasing Amendment Act of 1975, the
National Forest Management Act of 1976, and the
provisions of this Act .... 168
There is an inherent element of unfairness in such broad prohibitions
of surface mining on private holdings, national forests, and other fed-
eral lands, and courts should take notice of this unfairness.
The most difficult taking problem likely to arise under a section
522(e) prohibition of mining in a national forest may occur when the
Government has acquired a surface estate through donation or
purchase while the right to mine coal has remained in the grantor.
Such a situation is most like Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, for when
mining is prohibited, the grantor has lost the right to exploit that which
was expressly reserved in the grant.169 In Pennsylvania Coal the Court
noted: "[S]o far as private persons or communities have seen fit to take
the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that
their risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them of greater
rights than they bought."'170
There are distinguishing features, however, which may require a
different result in a section 522(e)(2) case. If the grantee had been a
private party rather than the United States, it would have been a valid
exercise of the police power to prohibit mining. Even though such reg-
ulation would render the mineral estate valueless, it would have been
valid in order to protect the public from water pollution, air pollution,
or damage to the economic community. The point is simply that no
matter who contracts with whom to sell or lease real property interests,
such contracts can never be used to insulate the parties from regulation
168. Id
169. 260 U.S. at 416. It should be observed, however, that while Justice Holmes purported to
pass on the constitutionality of the Kohler Act as it applied to surface rights purchased by a
government body, such statements are dictum because the case pertained only to subsidence of the
Mahons' private residence.
170. Id The similarity between Pennsylvania Coal and a National Forest prohibition under
section 522(e)(2) is evident in instances where the Government has purchased or sold mineral
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if the property is thereafter used to adversely affect others who are not
parties to the contract.
One exception to the general constitutional validity of section 522
is apparent, however, where the Government has literally enticed per-
sons to bid for and purchase the right to mine coal, especially in the
vast federal land holdings of the western and Rocky Mountain regions
of the United States. Where the right to mine coal has been purchased
under such circumstances, it seems patently unfair for the Government
to later deprive the purchaser of the contractual benefit which the Gov-
ernment itself solicited.
These examples are not intended to suggest that section 522 is un-
constitutional. On the contrary, the section would be unconstitutional
only if just compensation were not paid. It is evident, however, that
Congress has made provision, under the Tucker Act, for a mechanism
to compensate persons whose mining rights have been "taken". As a
practical matter, therefore, if courts find that an SMCRA related "tak-
ing" is compensable under the Tucker Act, there would be no constitu-
tional violation.
IV. CONCLUSION
For almost sixty years the precise holding of Pennsylvania Coal
has been misconstrued by state and federal courts. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has been a primary source of Pennsylvania Coal's mis-
interpretation. With all due respect, the Supreme Court has greatly
complicated constitutional taking jurisprudence by cavalierly citing
Pennsylvania Coal for a proposition that is not supported by a close
examination of the facts and holding of that case.
Pennsylvania Coal was not a case in which legislation was enacted
to serve an important public interest. Rather, the statute struck down
by the Court was directed at protecting private interests. Judicial mis-
interpretation of Pennsylvania Coal has resulted in the imposition of
undue weight on the diminution of private property values in the con-
text of valid police power legislation. Diminution of value is certainly
one factor to be considered in determining whether there has been an
exercise of the power of eminent domain. It is not, however, a relevant
factor in determining the validity of police power legislation enacted to
protect important public interests from harmful private activities. Such
legislation is digtinctly different from the type of government activity
appropriately characterized as an exercise of the power of eminent do-
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main. It defies logic to suggest that the Government's ability to afford
public protection from harmful private actions should be dependent
upon the regulation's financial impact on private sectors. The fifth
amendment was never intended to recognize or to secure vested prop-
erty rights in those whose private activities harm important public in-
terests.
It is hoped that the Supreme Court will take advantage of the op-
portunity presented in the cases now before it to eliminate more than a
half century of erroneous fifth amendment analysis. It can do this sim-
ply by analyzing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon on the basis of its
holding and not upon excerpted statements taken out of context from
that opinion. Such a reappraisal of Pennsylvania Coal will bring to the
law of takings the specific logic expressed in Justice Holmes' opinion
and it will greatly clarify an area of the law that has been confused as a
result of erroneous constitutional analysis.
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